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When, some 800 years ago, the funeral took place of the great Aristotelian scholar Averroes, 
his coffin was carried through the streets of Cordova.  It was placed in one of the panniers of 
a beast of burden while, on the other side, to balance it, were loaded all his writings.  One of 
those who witnessed this event was the young Ibn Arabi, later to become one of the great 
masters of the Sufi tradition.  Seeing the great man’s body, as it were, weighed against his 
works, he was moved to ask the question:  ‘Were his hopes fulfilled in his achievements?’
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This Paper honours the centenary of Sir Alister Hardy’s birth, and celebrates his 
achievements.  My part in this is to speak about the early days of what was then the Religious 
Experience Research Unit.  For those involved in this pioneering project, those were indeed 
very stimulating times, and I could attempt to convey some flavour of them with a great 
variety of anecdotes.  We may later have had our disagreements, but it is above all with great 
affection and gratitude that I look back on my association with Alister – as must, I feel sure, 
all those who worked with him.  Whatever other feelings one may have had when opening 
that extraordinary mass of letters which came in from those early appeals, it was 
tremendously exciting.  You simply never knew what the next post might bring. 
 
 
The Early Days of RERU 
The whole project was in fact a fascinating revelation of the potential range of human 
experience, whether one called it religious, spiritual, supernatural, psychic, paranormal, or 
whatever.  Such categories were immediately shown up to be for the most part inadequate 
and unworkable – if, that is, one were looking for distinct boundaries within which to classify 
this great wealth of material.  Classification was, of course, the immediate challenge.  One 
had to begin by imposing some sort of order on this seemingly chaotic body of data.  But was 
‘imposing’ the right word? 
 
One of Alister’s great strengths was a simplicity of purpose, a single-mindedness which was 
not easily diverted.  One commonly hears talk of a value-free science.  We are encouraged to 
think of the true scientist as a kind of Giacometti-like figure, stripped down to the bone, 
having shed all those weaknesses of flesh and blood – not to mention passion and ambition – 
to which the rest of us mortals are still subject.  This is, of course, a delusion.  The 
uncommitted scientist will never discover anything new, however valuable his or her work 
may be in proving or disproving what others have discovered.  And scepticism is itself a form 
of commitment:  a commitment to work without presuppositions.  But that is a self-
deception likely to prove as distorting as the most strongly held prejudice.  Alister did not 
deceive himself.  He was not a sceptic.  He knew what he knew, and all his life he had been 
waiting for this chance to devote himself to it.  “Grow old along with me, the best is yet to 
be” – so declares Browning’s Rabbi ben Ezra, who goes on to say 
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Enough now, if the Right 
And Good and Infinite 
Be named here, as thou callest thy hand thine own, 
With knowledge absolute, 
Subject to no dispute 
From fools that crowded youth, nor let thee feel alone.
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The “fools that crowded youth” were, of course, those scientists for whom the Darwinian 
system of evolution was a purely materialistic structure of ideas, which took no account of 
what Alister was later to call the spiritual nature of man
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  There is, of course, something 
acutely paradoxical in this proposal to combine this ‘knowledge absolute’ with the empirical 
methods of inductive science.  But, for one who related to the reality of the spiritual life with 
the same familiarity as he could call his hand his own (as Alister did), the path ahead seemed 
clear enough.  If that life was a reality, then proof must be available – must, in fact, be all 
around us, if only we had eyes to see it.  If a commitment to what is conceived of as ‘the 
scientific method’ is going to limit the field in which we are to look for that proof, then 
something must be wrong.  If we do not allow the very material we are working on to be 
continually challenging us – to be asking us: “But is this the best way to get to the heart of 
this particular problem?” – how can we ever expect to enlarge our view of the world? 
 
Alister himself, as is widely known, was very interested in such phenomena as telepathy and 
clairvoyance, an area of experience often labelled paranormal.  But what then is the normal?  
To many people, many otherwise quite intelligent people, the world is simply not the kind of 
place in which these things happen.  But if you already know what kind of place the world is, 
why bother to look further?  Remember the French scientist
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who declared that what he was 
observing could be explained only by saying that water might have a memory.  The idea was 
absurd;  he was boycotted by all his fellow scientists (I believe he still is).  There must of 
course be some other explanation:  one that is consistent with the established paradigms of 
the world of nature.  One must keep solid ground beneath one’s feet.  But what if that 
ground turns out to be no more than the shore of an infinite ocean?  That image would have 
appealed to Alister.  It was, after all, in marine biology that his scientific career had begun.  
Research into the human spirit was indeed to him not unlike the exploration of a vast and 
limitless sea inhabited by an endless variety of new forms of life. 
 
 
The Problems of Classification 
Faced with these astonishingly mixed and heterogeneous accounts of experience, our 
immediate task was to sort them out into some kind of order.  The established principles of 
taxonomy, as devised for the classification of the natural world, suggested a model:  a kind of 
Linnaean system
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 for the world of the human spirit.  Certain accounts which described 
experience of that world had obvious elements in common;  others had features which made 
them, at first sight, impossible to place in this fashion.  Perhaps fresh categories had to be 
devised for these, as it were ‘new’ species.  This, however, was where the model began to 
seem less apt. 
 
It was natural enough to begin by trying to impose an order on this chaos, much as you 
impose an order on a sinkful of washing up:  everything eventually gets put away in its right 
place so that, next time you want knives, you know where to look for them.  But there are 
limits to what gets put into a sink.  Human experience, and by definition experience of the 
transcendent, was a rather different proposition. 
 
One of Alister’s great strengths was that single-mindedness which enabled him to go ahead 
without being distracted by negative criticism, of which there was plenty.  This 
uncomplicated resolve drew much of its strength from an innate assurance, based upon 
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lifelong experience, that Homo sapiens was, quite simply, by nature a religious animal.  He 
was fond of quoting Jung’s reply to the question as to whether he believed in God:  he did not 
believe, he said, he knew.  Such a spontaneous, unquestioned conviction could, at times, 
raise problems.  If you are to make a scientific study – and in particular a taxonomic study – 
of any area of the natural world, you first have to establish the limits of that area.  So the 
entomologist
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 establishes clear and straightforward criteria for distinguishing the Coleoptera 
from the Diptera, so as to know what is a beetle and what is not.  So free was Alister from any 
doubts in this field that this question of limits was (at first, at least) not really faced.  What 
was it exactly on which we were setting out to impose an order? 
 
When people are asked to give accounts (to use Alister’s phrase) of “any awareness of some 
power beyond their everyday experience of life”, then any order to be discovered will be 
liable itself to have this same open-ended character.  Was it right to expect an order on the 
model of one that had been already discovered elsewhere?  Perhaps David Bohm’s word 
‘implicate’ is the one we need:  it was more likely to be an implicate order, in which 
everything is found to be intimately linked with everything else – a taxonomist’s nightmare
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.  
But any such implicate order will not only be one in which everything is (as the word 
suggests) folded in upon itself in a multidimensional whole.  It will be an order in which the 
observers will themselves be personally implicated.  There is, of course, nothing new in this 
idea that the observer will always to some extent be involved with the thing observed, and 
that the observation will be affected by that relationship.  So the more aware we are of our 
own presuppositions, or prejudices, the better we are able to allow for their influence.  The 
necessary detachment is still, in theory, possible. 
 
But no less important in any scientific inquiry is the freedom to adopt the methods most 
likely to get to the heart of the problem.  Stand outside Marks & Spencer with a clipboard and 
quiz people for five, or even ten, minutes each about their religious experiences (if any), 
following a standard questionnaire, and your chances of a positive response will not be high.  
Spend more time with each individual in a less public context, and you are likely to get a less 
negative result.  Go out of your way to meet them on their own ground, or in their own 
homes, where a more personal relationship becomes possible, and let one question arise out 
of the previous one, and all sorts of surprising revelations may be drawn out, eventually, with 
patience and sympathy.  (We used to call this the “Now that I come to think about it ...” 
syndrome.)  But such an abandonment of clinical detachment is always liable to be regarded 
with suspicion – and, anyway, any findings from such methods are likely to be less and less 
amenable to statistical analysis the further you depart from standard procedure.  The richer 
the tapestry of human experience that emerges, the more difficult it becomes to claim for 
the inquiry the objectivity of science. 
 
At one point in those early days, prompted by these and other such methodological 
problems, I published an article under the title of Tolerating the Paradoxical
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.  On this Alister 
observed that, whereas he (as a scientist) made it his business to eliminate paradox, I seemed 
to be celebrating it.  There is of course no reason why the analysis of paradox should itself be 
paradoxical.  Nevertheless, as I have said, there is a strong tendency for those who immerse 
themselves in the study of the more mysterious aspects of human life to find the material of 
their study, so to speak, encroaching on their own inquiry.  Alister would often claim to be 
following in the steps of William James
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.  But James’s striking insights into the varieties of 
religious experience were not the fruit of a cold detachment, but rather of a passionate 
enthusiasm for his subject.  William James was indeed a great pioneer.  But we might have 
gone back even further, and claimed an even more illustrious forerunner – one of the 
greatest scientific minds of the 17th century:  Blaise Pascal, for whom the last step of reason 
was to recognise that there are many things that lie beyond it. 
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The Data 
One way out of this dilemma was to say that it was not, in the first instance, the infinite 
varieties of religious experience that we were subjecting to this scientific scrutiny, but rather 
the data which our inquiry was putting at our disposal. It was the written accounts 
themselves that we had to look at.  Alister himself was fond of describing our work as a kind 
of natural history, the collection of material which would later be analysed along systematic 
lines.  In those first days we did indeed feel something of the excitement of the explorer, 
cutting a path through unmapped territory, investigating caverns perhaps measureless to 
humanity.  But even the most naïve natural historian has soon to start sorting out his or her 
collections, if only to provide an index to make them accessible for further study. 
 
Here, of course, the computer is an unrivalled tool.  How Aristotle would have loved it.  Yet it 
was he who surely said the last word on the illusions which the computer may generate.  It 
was, he said, the mark of a well-trained mind not to look for a greater degree of precision 
than was appropriate to the subject matter
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.  So the detailed analysis of the language people 
used in order to describe their experience of the transcendent might well be of great value.  
But was the precision of such an analysis appropriate?  Here we ran into another problem. 
 
This was that the writers of these letters would frequently disavow the language they 
themselves used.  The experience, they would say, was quite indescribable.  “I had no words 
to describe it then”, one correspondent wrote, of an experience of her childhood, “and I have 
no words to describe it now”.  More often, they would search around for some simile or com-
parison, some metaphor to convey something which (they insisted) was beyond any such 
words – something qualitatively of a different order. That is to say, they would use the 
language not of information but of the imagination:  the language of poetry.  So if we were 
still to insist that the immediate matter, the data, of our research was not so much the 
experiences themselves as the actual accounts which we had in our files, there still remained 
the challenge of how to evaluate the language in which they were written – language which, 
for the most part, was notable for its imprecision.  Language can be analysed;  no problem 
about that these days.  The mind can be well-trained to exploit the resources of modern 
technology.  But what we were up against here was what Kierkegaard would have called 
indirect communication;  and what kind of training is called for if one is to do justice to that? 
 
I may seem to be telling a story of frustration, of false trails and dead ends, but it did not feel 
like that at the time. Nor should it now. True, as that classification seemed to proliferate 
almost endlessly, with new categories continually being required to accommodate new 
material, there appeared to be no reason why, like the universe itself, it should not go on for 
ever. But if one horizon was perpetually being replaced by another, the terrain to be 
traversed did reveal itself to be infinitely richer than anyone could have surmised at the 
beginning.  It might turn out that our original objectives were not so easily attainable. But 
that was no reason for giving up; rather the reverse. 
 
This surely is the kind of situation that any great creative endeavour is likely to find itself 
facing.  I remember once talking with Michael Polanyi
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 about this way in which positive 
results may emerge from apparent failures, both in the arts and in scientific research.  “Yes”, 
he said, “all my most interesting discoveries were disappointments at the time.”  Einstein 
devoted the later years of his life to a search for a unifying theory which would bring together 
all his earlier work into a grand overarching design.  This he never achieved.  It could be said 
that he allowed metaphysics to take over from physics. 
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This was not Alister’s way.  His approach never ceased to be empirical.  True, he did feel some 
disappointment at the progress of the work.  For someone so deeply committed to a 
scientific method that was satisfied with nothing less than quantifiable results, it was hard to 
accept that not all our findings could be expressed in statistical form.  Nevertheless, just as 
what we were coming up with was gradually, if at times imperceptibly, to shift the paradigms 
of what was to be taken seriously, so Alister himself was to the last open to things that would 
question his most basic presuppositions.  No-one could have been a more loyal Darwinian.  
Yet, when awkward facts turned up which would not easily fit into that system, he would say, 
almost in a whisper and, as it were, looking over his shoulder, “Perhaps Lamarck was right 
after all”.
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The Archive 
Here let me go back to Browning: 
All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist ... 
 When eternity affirms the conception of an hour. 
And what is our failure here but a triumph’s evidence 
 For the fulness of the days?
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My business here, of course, is not with eternity. and the fullness of the days is something 
none of us will live to see.  Nor is failure the word I would use of the achievements of those 
early days.  What they did have to teach us was that, in an undertaking of this scope, there 
are no right answers, only the right kind of questions.  And no two people will bring the same 
questions. 
 
That is the real achievement:  that this archive has been brought into existence, and is still 
growing – and it is there, it is here, available as a unique resource for all those who come to it 
with an appropriate humility, not hoping for some Hegelian synthesis but ready to find new 
and unexpected light thrown on all the more mysterious aspects of our humanity. 
 
 
Sir Alister Hardy’s Achievements 
So if, finally, one were to ask what Alister achieved in this initially very lonely quest, I would 
sum it up under three headings. 
 
First, he showed that spirituality, however defined, is not the preserve of theology.  The chilly 
silence with which the early efforts of RERU were greeted by the Oxford Faculty of Theology 
spoke louder than any words.  But the very fact that a book with the title of The Spiritual 
Nature of Man could have been written by a scientist was itself a sign that the weather was 
changing.  Sir Alister was not, of course, unique in this.  What he did do was to add his not 
inconsiderable voice to the growing number of those who believed that evidence for the 
reality of the spiritual world was to be found all around us, in whatever discipline one looked 
for it.  In the field of education alone his influence has been most significant
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.  The spiritual 
dimension is now recognised, along with the historical, the mathematical, the literary, the 
scientific and so on, as having an autonomous claim to a place in the national curriculum.  
This by itself is evidence of that change in the climate to which Sir Alister made a significant 
contribution. 
 
Secondly, there has (as we know) been much development of genetic theory in recent years.  
Suggestions have been made that the key to an understanding not only of intelligence but 
even such qualities as altruism may be found in our genes.  But may this thinking not 
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represent a defence of traditional biological values against the idea – absurd, of course – that 
there may be in us all a capacity for experience of a kind to which biologists have generally 
been indifferent, the spiritual?  A capacity which, to use the language of taxonomy, may turn 
out to be the most specific diagnostic indicator of our essential humanity?  (Altruism is in fact 
a pretty arid concept;  but you cannot expect scientists to talk about love, any more than you 
can expect herbarium botanists to consider such things as the smell, taste or succulence of 
flowers in their classification of the living world.) 
 
Finally, though, there is something that may well seem an achievement much humbler than 
anything to be described in theological or scientific terms.  When Sir Alister Hardy died, we 
received a number of letters
15
 from people who said, quite simply, how grateful they were to 
him.  Now, they wrote, it was possible to talk about things they never felt they could talk 
about before:  feelings that, they now realised, were a normal and important part of life but 
which up to then they could not share with other people because they would be thought 
queer or even mentally unbalanced.  Now the right and good and infinite could at last be 
named “as thou callest thy hand thine own”.  It was like opening a window and letting fresh 
air into a stuffy room. 
 
I may seem to have trespassed somewhat beyond my brief which was to speak of the early 
days of this research project.  In view of the immense possibilities still to be realised, I can 
only say that it is even now in its early stages.  At least, that is my hope.  When I started 
reading Greats in this University half a century or so ago, I was recommended to go to some 
lectures given by a very senior philosopher on the subject of Elementary Problems in Philo-
sophy.  He began by telling us that all the problems of philosophy were elementary.  Not 
easy, perhaps, but still elementary.  Can one say anything less for the study of religious 
experience? 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
1. See Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn Arabi, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series XCI, 1969), pp.42f. 
2. Robert Browning: Rabbi ben Ezra.  The previous stanza is no less apt: 
   As it was better, youth 
  Should strive, through acts uncouth 
  Toward making, than repose on aught found made: 
  So better, age, exempt 
  From strife, should know, than tempt 
  Further.  Thou waitedst age:  wait death nor be afraid. 
3. The Spiritual Nature of Man:  A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience  (Alister Hardy 
Trust, reprinted 1997) is the account by Sir Alister Hardy of the first eight years’ work of the 
RERU which he had founded in 1969, and focuses on spiritual feeling in a scientific age. 
4. Jacques Benveniste, a renowned French immunologist, noted in an experiment that an 
incredibly dilute solution of a remedy nevertheless had a significant effect on the movement 
of blood lymphocytes, thus proving the homeopathic principle. 
5. In 1737 Carolus Linnaeus (1707-78) enunciated his principles for defining genera and species, 
adhering to a uniform use of two Latin words (one noun and one adjective) for naming all 
plants and animals.  The best known example is Homo sapiens. 
7 
 
6. An entomologist is one who studies insects. 
7. See David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1980). 
8. ‘Tolerating the Paradoxical:  A Scientific Approach to Religious Experience’ in Faith and 
Freedom, Vol.31, part 2, 1978. 
9. William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience, original edition 1902, Harvard 
University Press, 1985. 
10. Aristotle:  Physics, 199B. 
11. For an assessment of Polyani’s thought, see J. Crewdson, Christian Doctrine in the Light of 
Michael Polyani’s Theory of Personal Knowledge, Edwin Mellor Press, 1994. 
12. Lamarck (1744-1829) believed that acquired characters in animals and plants could be 
transmitted to their offspring.  Darwin denied this. 
13. Robert Browning: Abt Vogler. 
14. See, for example, the work of David Hay and texts such as New Methods in R.E. Teaching:  An 
Experiential Approach :  John Hammond, David Hay and others, Oliver & Boyd, 1990. 
15. These further letters from those who had written with personal accounts of their religious 
experiences were filed with their original contributions. 
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